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JOHN LIPPITT
A FUNNY THING HAPPENED TO ME ON
THE WAY TO SALVATION: CLIMACUS AS
HUMORIST IN KIERKEGAARD’S
CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT
1. introduction
Much recent Kierkegaard scholarship has paid particular attention to vari-
ous aspects of the literary form of his authorship, such as the significance of
his writing under various pseudonyms. The focus has been upon ‘style ’ as
much as ‘content ’ ; the ‘how’ as much as the ‘what ’ of Kierkegaard’s
writing. Within this context, James Conant has argued, in a series of articles,"
that there are important parallels between the Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(authored by the Kierkegaardian pseudonym Johannes Climacus) and
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. However, Conant argues that these parallels have
been misunderstood by previous commentators. The main aim of this article
is to challenge Conant’s argument that the Postscript should be read as
containing ‘nonsense…simple, old garden variety nonsense ’.# This, we shall
see, relies upon a particular view of the significance of Climacus’s
‘ revocation’ of the text. The commentators whom Conant wants to criticize
allegedly hold that the Tractatus and the Postscript provide ‘essential prelimi-
nary noise ’$ to the realization that those issues which really matter – in
particular, ethics and religion – cannot be spoken of. These commentators,
according to Conant, insist on the existence of a kind of speech ‘that lacks
sense while still being able to convey volumes’.%
The Postscript allegedly exemplifies such speech as follows. The ‘subjective
truths ’ of ethics and religion are not expressible in language, but only in the
‘existential ’ context of an individual’s life. Moreover, the central distin-
guishing feature of Christianity – the incarnation – is not only inexpressible
linguistically ; it also : ‘ represents the purest antithesis of what is rationally
" ‘Must we show what we cannot say? ’ in R. Fleming and M. Payne (eds), The Senses of Stanley Cavell
(Lewisbury, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1989) ; ‘Kierkegaard, Wittenstein and Nonsense ’ in Ted
Cohen, Paul Guyer and Hilary Putnam (eds) Pursuits of Reason (Texas Tech University Press, 1993) ;
‘Putting Two and Two Together ’ in Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr (eds) Philosophy and the
Grammar of Religious Belief (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995) ; hereafter MWS, KWN and PTTT respect-
ively. Conant’s work has influenced other recent writing on Kierkegaard: see, for instance, Stephen
Mulhall Faith and Reason (London: Duckworth, 1994), especially Chapter 3.
# MWS, p. 253. $ MWS, p. 249. % Ibid.
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comprehensible. It presents us with the extremest form of nonsense.
Notice…the importance of ascribing…an underlying conception of a
hierarchy of nonsense.)…[T]he absolute paradox [of the incarnation] can
be identified as the paradox precisely because it is absolutely incomprehensible.
Such a paradox presents the ultimate spur to faith, for in its attempt to
assimilate the paradox the understanding will recurrently crucify itself and
momentarily liberate us from any interference on its part in our relation to
God. ’& Though the absolute paradox cannot be stated directly, we can point
to its possible existence ‘by demarcating the scope of the understanding and
delineating its ultimate limits ’.' No author can ‘directly say anything of
meaningful religious import to us ’ ; hence Climacus’s need to ‘revoke’ the
text, through which he ‘ jettisons the entire structure he has previously
constructed, leaving us with a silence in which we are allegedly supposed to
be able to discern the distilled content of his project to indirectly com-
municate to us the nature of the truth of Christianity’.(
Conant, by contrast, argues that speech which ‘ lacks sense while still being
able to convey volumes’ is impossible. For Conant, when Climacus and
Wittgenstein each claim, at the end of their respective books, that their work
is nonsense (in Climacus’s case, this is the job allegedly performed by the
‘revocation’ of the text in the ‘Appendix’), they mean what they say; what
they have each spent the previous pages saying is plain nonsense ; not, as many
commentators have assumed, nonsense which is somehow profound.
2. climacus ’ s revocation
To tackle this issue, we clearly need to focus upon Climacus’s ‘ revocation’. As
mentioned above, this takes place in an ‘Appendix’ to the Postscript entitled
‘An Understanding with the Reader’. Its form is as follows. Climacus asserts
that, although the book is about becoming a Christian, he is not himself a
Christian; rather, he says, he is ‘a humorist ; satisfied with his circumstances
at the moment, hoping that something better will befall his lot, he feels
especially happy, if worst comes to worst, to be born in this speculative,
theocentric century’ (CUP 617).) The humorist has nothing to teach, unlike
‘ speculative thinkers and great men with matchless discoveries ’ (ibid.).
Hence the book ‘ is about myself, simply and solely about myself ’ ; in par-
ticular, it is about how Climacus can relate himself to that ‘highest good in
store that is called an eternal happiness ’ and which Christianity promises. It
& Ibid. ' Ibid. ( Ibid.
) Quotations which I make from Concluding Unscientific Postscript are from the translation by Howard
V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). The only exceptions to this are
when I ‘requote ’ something already quoted by Conant. In these cases, since Conant quotes from the
older translation by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941),
I have, when ‘requoting’, used this translation too; while nevertheless also giving a reference to the place
in Hong and Hong where the relevant passage can be found.
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is against this background that Climacus claims that his book is ‘ superfluous ’
(CUP 618) ; that it should not be appealed to (ibid.) ; and that he ‘has no
opinion’ (‘except that it must be the most difficult of all to become a
Christian’ (CUP 619)). Then comes these oft-quoted lines :
Just as in Catholic books, especially from former times, one finds a note at the back
of the book that notifies the reader that everything is to be understood in accordance
with the teaching of the holy universal mother Church, so also what I write contains
the notice that everything is to be understood in such a way that it is revoked
[tilbagekaldt], that the book has not only a conclusion [Slutning] but has a revocation
[Tilbagekaldelse*] to boot (CUP 619)."!
3. how should we read the ‘revocation ’ ?
Our concern here is how this revocation is to be taken. Conant castigates
‘most commentators ’ for ‘ simply neglect[ing] ’ the remarks in which
Climacus’s ‘ revocation’ appears."" The issue, I shall aim to show in what
follows, is not whether or not we should neglect it – clearly we should not
– but of the way in which we should read it ; and the relative importance we
should attach to it. In this second article, Conant suggests that he agrees
with this : ‘I am inclined to think that one will not be in a position to
understand either of these books until one has a satisfying account of the
spirit in which, in each case, this revocation is intended. ’"# But we shall
disagree as to what this ‘ spirit ’ is.
How, then, should the revocation be read? Note that, after mentioning his
‘ imaginary reader ’, Climacus remarks of this ‘most pleasant of all readers ’
that : ‘He can understand that to write a book and revoke it is not the same
as refraining from writing it, that to write a book that does not demand to
be important for anyone is still not the same as letting it be unwritten’
(CUP 621). And he goes on to ‘ stress a certain honesty that forbids me to
parrot what I am unable to understand…an honesty that in turn comforts
me and arms me with a more than ordinary sense of the comic and a certain
capacity for making ludicrous what is ludicrous ’ (CUP 622).
It is important to understand the above if we are to understand the ‘ spirit
in which the revocation is intended’. As a preliminary, we should observe
that Conant is at times unclear as to exactly what Climacus is supposed to
be revoking. He claims that the text provides a ladder which, as with the
Tractatus, we should simply throw away once we have ascended it. So is
* Tilbagekaldelse : ‘1) recall ; 2) revocation, recantation, retraction, withdrawal ; 3) cancellation, an-
nulment, repeal ’ (Hermann Vinterberg and C. A. Bodelsen (eds) Dansk-Engelsk Ordbog (Copenhagen:
Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1956)).
"! I have modified the Hongs’ translation slightly. In this passage, they translate Slutning as ‘end’ ; I
have, along with Swenson and Lowrie, gone for ‘conclusion’ because Climacus is here clearly referring
back to the section immediately preceding the Appendix. This is also headed Slutning in the original text ;
and both sets of translators have labelled this section ‘Conclusion’.
"" See MWS, p. 276n22. "# KWN, p. 197.
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Climacus supposed to be revoking the whole text? Sometimes, Conant does
indeed seem to be saying this. For instance, at one point he claims that : ‘The
only insight these works wish to impart in the end – once the reader has
climbed to the top of the ladder – is one about the reader himself : that he is
prone to such illusions. ’"$ (These illusions, we shall shortly see, are those
which give us the impression that we are able to occupy a perspective from
which we can grasp the Christian incarnation; that ‘absolute paradox’
which is maximally repellant to reason.) More precisely, Climacus is sup-
posed to be revoking all but the ‘ frame’ ; those sections in which he allegedly
provides ‘directions ’ for how the text is to be read. This ‘ frame’ is supposed
to be constituted by the ‘Appendix’, and the earlier ‘Glance at a Contem-
porary Effort in Danish Literature’, in which Climacus gives his own views
on the work of Kierkegaard’s other pseudonyms, and the Edifying Discourses
penned under Kierkegaard’s own name."%
However, elsewhere Conant says that Climacus ‘ identifies only the final
doctrine [the incarnation]; with which the work reaches its climax, as an
‘‘absurdity’’…the reader…needs to see only that the author’s earlier
propositions are marshalled in support of an argument that eventually
culminates in a piece of nonsense ’."&
What is allegedly being revoked, then, is rather less than clear. It would
be odd if Conant were claiming that only part of the non-‘ framing’ part of
the text should be revoked. If we pay close attention to Climacus’s exact
words, we cannot help but notice that they claim to revoke the whole text :
‘what I write contains the notice that everything is to be understood in such
a way that it is revoked’ (CUP 619, my emphasis). So any claim that only
part of the text is to be revoked is not supported by this vital ‘Appendix’. So
let us assume that, other than the ‘ frame’, Conant is saying that the whole
of the rest of the text is intended to be ‘revoked’ in a certain sense.
3.1 Conant on Climacus and nonsense
The sense in which this is so will become clearer if we unpack Conant’s claim
that the movement within the Postscript is from ‘propositions for which a
clear sense can be given (depending upon whether we construe them aes-
thetically or religiously), to ones which teeter on the brink of sense (where
mere truisms are insisted upon) to sheer nonsense (an affirmation of objective
absurdity) ’."' Which sections are supposed to be which? The clearest ex-
planation of this comes in Conant’s second article ; and an exposition at this
point will aid our understanding.
Conant takes Climacus’s main aim to be the essentially Wittgensteinian
task of dispelling philosophical confusion. In relation to the Postscript’s subject
– the problem of ‘becoming a Christian’ – he sees Climacus’s task as being
"$ PTTT, p. 282, my emphasis. "% See KWN, p. 202.
"& KWN, p. 223n85, my emphasis. "' Ibid.
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to enable the philosopher to see that this is not an epistemological question;
what he requires in relation to it is not further knowledge. According to
Conant, ‘ the work as a whole represents an elaborate reductio ad absurdum of
the philosophical project of clarifying and propounding what it is to be a
Christian’."(
But the first book of the Postscript appears to be involved in exactly such
a project. It ‘appears to be concerned to argue that the truth of Christianity
cannot be established on objective grounds’ ;") that none of scripture, the
Church or the religion’s having survived for centuries, can provide adequate
reasons for Christian faith. Conant observes that Climacus appears to be
‘advancing an epistemological argument to the effect that any form of
objective reasoning or objective knowledge cannot attain the pitch of cer-
tainty that is appropriate to religious faith’."* But this way of presenting
things ‘ invites the reader to picture religious faith as continuous with ordinary
forms of belief, though somehow fortified with an epistemologically more
secure foundation’.#! It is exactly this kind of talk, according to Conant,
that Climacus wishes–indirectly–to question. The philosopher mistakenly
construes faith as a kind of knowledge. Such ‘dialectical confusion’ arises from
his failure to pay attention to the crucial differences in meaning which come
about according to whether the terms under discussion are being used in
‘aesthetic ’, ‘ethical ’ or ‘religious ’ contexts.#" A specifically religious use of
terms like ‘ faith’ or ‘revelation’ only has a sense ‘within the context of a
certain kind of life ’.## But the philosopher tends to be insensitive to this :
‘When he discovers that evidence does not play the role…in a religious
context that it would in an ordinary context, the philosopher concludes that
evidence must play a peculiar role…or…that a peculiar kind of evidence must
be involved. ’#$ But the aim of Climacus’s grammatical investigation ‘ is to
show the philosopher that appeals to evidence have no role to play of the sort
that he imagines in the logic of religious concepts such as faith and reve-
lation’.#% The philosopher tends to overlook the fundamental change in
meaning which occurs when such terms are used in religious, as opposed to
epistemic, contexts. So this is the section of the Postscript which contains
‘propositions for which a clear sense can be given’ ; provided they are
construed religiously. But the philosopher who reads ‘ faith’ as something
epistemic is mistakenly construing it ‘aesthetically ’.
Next, Conant argues, the Postscript deliberately starts going further astray.
As the text progresses, rather than sticking to ‘grammatical investigations ’,
Climacus starts to advance a philosophical thesis. That faith and ‘objective’
reasoning are incommensurable is offered as a counter-thesis to the
philosopher’s assumption that ordinary belief and religious faith are simply
"( KWN, p. 207. ") Ibid. "* KWN, p. 208. #! Ibid.
#" I am here using these terms in a Kierkegaardian sense ; as the three major ‘existence-spheres ’ or
‘ stages on life’s way’. ## KWN, p. 209. #$ Ibid. #% Ibid., my emphasis.
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different points along the same epistemic spectrum. ‘Rather than simply
showing the philosopher that he has run the categories together in a fashion
that has led him to speak nonsense, Climacus offer his thesis in the form of
the negation of the philosopher’s claim. But the attempt to negate a piece of
nonsense results in another piece of nonsense. ’#&
What is the philosopher saying that is supposed to be nonsense? It is those
utterances which he makes as a result of his assumption that religious faith
and ordinary belief are both epistemological entities. And what is Climacus’s
nonsense? Immediately before the above quotation, Conant says that
Climacus ‘ends up by representing what is a mere truism as his own
intellectual discovery, his contribution to knowledge’.#' This suggests that
Conant is objecting to Climacus’s claiming as a thesis something which is
simply supposed to be obvious once it is pointed out as the result of a
grammatical investigation. So the point is that dispelling confusion should not be
presented as offering a ‘ thesis ’. To do so is to speak nonsense.
However, Conant continues, Chapter 1#( appears to build up to just such
a thesis : ‘an infinite personal interest, insofar as it is essentially incommen-
surable with ordinary forms of rational justification, requires a leap of faith
– an act of resolve that closes its eyes to the objective probability of the article
of faith. ’#) Things starting smelling fishier still in ‘Something about Lessing’
(Part 2, Section 1) ; which includes a subsection (Chapter 2 of Section 1)
entitled ‘Theses Possibly or Actually Attributable to Lessing’.#* This title is
ironic, Conant claims, since attributing ‘ theses ’ to Lessing would involve
missing the latter’s own irony. Lessing appears to be offering an argument
paralleling the one which Climacus appears to offer; one ‘concerning the
impossibility of a rational transition from purely historical (or empirical)
grounds to the metaphysical and moral truths associated with the Christian
teaching’.$! But Climacus claims that Lessing in fact intends this ironically.
Lessing talks of the ‘ugly broad ditch’ over which he is unable to leap in
faith. Climacus focuses upon his saying ‘I cannot cross…however earnestly
I have tried to make the leap’, and comments :
‘Perhaps it is also cunning on Lessing’s part to employ the word ernstlich [earnestly],
because with regard to what it means to leap, especially when the metaphor is
developed for the imagination, earnestness is droll enough, inasmuch as it stands in
no relation, or in a comic relation, to the leap, since it is not the breadth of the ditch
in an external sense that prevents it but the dialectical passion in an internal sense
that makes the ditch infinitely broad. To have been very close to doing something
already has its comic aspect, but to have been very close to making the leap is nothing
whatever, precisely because the leap is the category of decision. And now in utmost
#& KWN, p. 210. #' Ibid.
#( I think that he in fact means the whole of the Første Deel – what the Hongs label ‘Part One’, and
what Swenson and Lowrie label ‘Book One’. This in fact has two chapters (capitel). But this assumption
makes the best sense of what Conant goes on to say next. #) KWN, p. 210.
#* The Hongs translate Mulige og virkelige Theses af Lessing more directly, as ‘Possible and Actual Theses
by Lessing’. $! KWN, p. 211.
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earnestness to have wanted to make the leap – yes, that Lessing is indeed a rogue,$"
for surely he has, if anything, with the utmost earnestness made the ditch broad –
is that not just like making fun of people ! ’ (CUP 99)
In other words, both Lessing and Climacus appear to be advancing a philo-
sophical doctrine about the nature of Christianity; but should really be seen
as parodying any such attempt. Climacus’s ‘argument’ culminates in a claim
that ‘ from the standpoint of objective thought, the object of faith must be
maximally indigestible to reason’.$# Christianity’s superiority lies in its asking
us to believe in something – the ‘absolute paradox’ of the incarnation –
which requires ‘ the complete sacrifice of one’s reason’ ; a ‘crucifixion of the
understanding’.$$ But Conant points out that Climacus also says that
‘Nonsense…[the believer] cannot believe against the understanding, for
precisely the understanding will discern that it is nonsense and prevent him
from believing it ’.$% Underlying such claims, Conant argues, must be the
idea that the believer retains his understanding; for it is precisely this which
enables him to distinguish between ‘the objective absurdity of Christian
doctrine and less repulsive forms of nonsense…Climacus’s analysis therefore
commits him to a distinction between mere absurdity and ‘‘objective ab-
surdity ’’ – a category of deep nonsense which is supposed to be qualitatively
more repellant to reason than ordinary nonsense ’.$& But this view, argues
Conant, is itself nonsense. We cannot ‘rank incomprehensible ‘‘ thoughts ’’
by the degree of their absurdity’.$' How could we determine that the
statement ‘God became man in Jesus Christ ’ is more nonsensical than, say,
‘My thoughts smell belligerently’? If it is true that both are nonsense, then
that is all there is to it ; there is no way that we can judge the former to be
more nonsensical than the latter. Nonsense does not come in ‘a spectrum of
degrees ’.$(
Conant concludes that scholars who have attempted to ‘water down and
clean up’$) Climacus’s argument – thus preventing the Postscript from look-
ing like a parody of serious philosophy – have missed the point. ‘When
approaching the Postscript, a scholarly commitment to adhere at all costs to
such a principle of sympathetic textual interpretation – while systematically
ignoring what Climacus calls the ‘‘ incessant activity of irony’’ in the work
– will lead one astray. Indeed this has been the fate of all the standard
attempts to extract the argument of the work while ignoring Climacus’s
vehement warnings about the work’s peculiar character – in particular, his
remark at the end that the book was written in order to be revoked. ’$* Hence
$" The word here translated as ‘rogue’ is Skjelm ; an alternative translation, used by Swenson and
Lowrie, and which more clearly brings out the ‘comic’ element, is ‘wag’. $# KWN, p. 215.
$$ Ibid.
$% CUP, trans. Swenson and Lowrie, p. 504. Since Conant quotes this passage from the Swenson and
Lowrie translation, I have not amended it. The Hongs’ translation of the same passage, which appears
on their p. 568, is not different in any significant way. $& KWN, p. 215. $' Ibid.
$( Ibid. $) Ibid. $* KWN, pp. 215–16.
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Conant’s final conclusion that : ‘The dialectical ladder of the Postscript
culminates in a demonstration and declaration of the nonsensicality of its
doctrine. Its doctrine turns out to be a pseudo-doctrine. It is a ladder which
once we have climbed up it, we are asked to throw away. ’%! We have climbed
up it, and are ready to throw it away, when, having understood that
Climacus is showing us a position from which we shall be led to speak
nonsense if we advance certain kinds of theses, ‘we are no longer tempted to
advance such theses ourselves ’.%"
The above exposition shows us the sense in which Conant is claiming that
the whole text is revoked. There is much that is perceptive in this analysis.
However, there are problems with Conant’s argument itself, and there are
also factors he overlooks which are vital to our understanding of the revo-
cation. Let us consider each of these in turn.
3.2 Some criticisms of Conant’s argument
To begin with, I want to consider two problems with Conant’s argument.
First, Climacus’s comment about the ‘ incessant activity of irony’, and the
‘parody on speculative philosophy’, is in fact made about his other work, the
Philosophical Fragments, not the Postscript.%# It is of course possible that
Climacus might think the same comment can be made about the Postscript
too, but he does not explicitly say so, and Conant is on very dodgy ground
in basing an important part of an argument about one text on the basis of
what its author says about another! Moreover, we should note that Fragments
is not revoked.
Secondly, we have seen Conant argue that the Postscript culminates in a
nonsensical doctrine and that, moreover, we are supposed eventually to see
that this is nonsensical. This is apparently shown to us by Climcacus’s
committing himself to an allegedly nonsensical distinction between the
‘absolute paradox’ and ‘ less repulsive forms of nonsense ’. The problem with
this is twofold. Firstly, there is evidence that Kierkegaard himself states a
view of the ‘absolute paradox’ strikingly similar to the view that according
to Conant, the Postscript is supposed to show up as nonsensical. Moreover,
Kierkegaard appears still to have held his view several years after the
Postscript’s publication in 1846. Secondly, I suggest that Conant misconstrues
the sense in which the ‘absolute paradox’ is more ‘repulsive ’ than other
forms of nonsense. It is not so because it is somehow more nonsensical than
everyday, run of the mill nonsense. The ‘repulsion’ stems rather from the
offensiveness of Christianity. Let us address these points in turn.
In relation to the first point, several entries in Kierkegaard’s journals hint
at the similarity between Climacus’s view of the ‘absolute paradox’ and
%! KWN, p. 216. %" KWN, p. 218.
%# CUP, trans. Swenson and Lowrie, p. 245n; cf. trans. Hong and Hong, p. 275n.
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Kierkegaard’s own. These include a reply Kierkegaard wrote to the
Icelandic theologian Magnus Eiriksson, who had attacked the former’s
position on the relation between faith and reason in a pseudonymous pam-
phlet.%$ In his reply, Kierkegaard addresses Eiriksson thus:
The new and peculiar turn you give to the affair is that you dismiss the whole of
Christianity and then, with a triumphant countenance, inquire : ‘But where is the
paradoxical? ’ You might better have asked: ‘But where is Christianity? ’%%
This suggests that Christianity’s very nature is paradoxical ; and indeed,
Kierkegaard later asserts that ‘Christianity is a paradox’.%& Moreover, in
comparing ‘ faith’ in Fear and Trembling with ‘paradox’ in the Postscript,
Kierkegaard acknowledges that there is a difference, and that this difference
centres on the Postscript’s concern with ‘ faith in relation to a doctrine ’ ;%' i.e.
the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. Moreover, Kierkegaard adds, ‘ it
is one thing to believe in virtue of the Absurd and another to believe the Absurd.
The first expression is employed by Johannes de Silentio, the other by
Johannes Climacus. ’%( In other words, Silentio’s notion that the not
specifically Christian faith of, say, Abraham is held ‘ in virtue of the absurd’,
has been replaced in the Postscript with a more concrete content – the
incarnation – which is itself labelled as ‘ the absurd’. But the ‘absurdity’ of
the incarnation is not presented as a reason to reject it ; it simply signals that
this is not something rationally comprehensible. In a journal entry of 1850
(the same year as the reply to Eiriksson), Kierkegaard says : ‘ the concept of
the absurd is precisely to grasp the fact that it cannot and must not be
grasped. The absurd, the paradox, is composed in such a way that reason has
no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is nonsense ; no,
it is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about which reason must say:
I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow thereby that
it is nonsense. But if faith is completely abolished, the whole sphere is
dropped, and then reason becomes conceited and perhaps concludes that,
ergo, the paradox is nonsense. ’%)
%$ The pamphlet had the less than catchy title Can Faith Ever be a Paradox? And This Because of the
Absurd? A Problem Occasioned by the Book, Fear and Trembling by Johannes de Silentio, Who Is Answered through
Private Communications of a Knight of Faith, a Brother of the Knight of Faith, Theophilus Nicolaus.
%% Kierkegaard’s reply was unpublished, but these and other passages from it are quoted at length in
Cornelio Fabro, ‘Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic ’, trans. J. B. Mondin, in Howard A. Johnson
and Niels Thulstrup (eds), A Kierkegaard Critique (New York: Harper and Bros, 1962), pp. 156–206. This
particular quote is on p. 180. This material can also be found in Soren Kierkegaard ’s Journals and Papers.
Vol. 1 (entries 9–12) and 6 (entries 6598–6601), ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967 and 1978 respectively).
%& Op. cit. p. 181. The same or similar claims are made in several journal entries, e.g. entries 3092, 3093,
3095, 3097 and 3098 in Soren Kierkegaard ’s Journals and Papers. Vol. 3, ed. and trans. Howard V. and
Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975).
%' Op. cit. p. 183, my emphasis.
%( Op. cit. p. 184, my emphasis. Just as Climacus is the pseudonymous author of the Postscript, Silentio
is the pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling.
%) Soren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, Vol. 1, entry 7. Note also that in this same entry, Kierkegaard
identifies at least part of Climacus’s work with himself : ‘This is what I have developed (for example in
Concluding Postscript) – that not every absurdity is the absurd or the paradox. ’
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Note the claim: reason cannot deal with the Christian paradox, ‘but it does
not follow thereby that it is nonsense ’. Conant would have us believe otherwise ;
and that Kierkegaard’s overall authorial intention is that we are supposed
to see this. In fact, Kierkegaard adds to the above the claim that from the
standpoint of ‘ faith’, what appears from the outside to be ‘absurd’ is ‘ trans-
formed’ : ‘When the believer believes, the Absurd is not the Absurd – faith
transforms it…The passion of faith is the only thing capable of mastering the
Absurd. ’%*
Our task here is neither to support nor dispute Kierkegaard’s views on this
matter. It is simply to observe that these quotations in Kierkegaard’s own
voice are at odds with what Conant would have us believe about the
overall authorial intention of the Postscript. In other words, Conant’s
assumption that the view of the ‘absolute paradox’ expressed by Climacus
in the Postscript was not Kierkegaard’s own – and that the work itself, read
rightly, should enable us to see this – can be questioned by the fact that,
writing in his private journal, Kierkegaard expresses views remarkably simi-
lar to the readings of the Postscript which Conant is keen to dispute. Indeed,
in the final sentence of his reply to Eiriksson, Kierkegaard remarks : ‘I would
be glad to have another pseudonym, one who does not like Johannes de
Silentio say he does not have faith, but plainly, positively says he has faith
– Anti-Climacus – repeat what, as a matter of fact, is stated in the pseudo-
nymous writings. ’&!
As an important corollary, we might ask: how is the ‘absurdity’ of the
absolute paradox different from ‘standard’ nonsense? This brings us to our
second point. I suggest that what is supposed to make the ‘absolute paradox’
uniquely ‘repulsive ’ is the offensiveness of Christianity, as stressed, for
instance, by Kierkegaard in his reply to Eriksson, and by his Christian
pseudonym Anti-Climacus in Practise in Christianity. Such factors as God’s
appearance as a humble carpenter, while yet demanding obedience; His sub-
mitting himself to suffering and humiliation while remaining somehow God,
means, according to Kierkegaard, that there are two possible responses to
‘ true’ Christianity (as opposed to the misrepresentations of it common in
‘Christendom’). The two possibilities are faith or offence. Hence ‘ the
absurd’, construed as a Christian category, ‘ is not nonsense but offence’.&"
The absolute paradox is more offensive than ‘ordinary nonsense ’ not because
it is simply more nonsensical ; it is so because, while appearing to be nonsense
to those without faith, it demands existential allegiance. It is one thing to talk
‘ordinary’ nonsense which is ‘offensive to reason’ ; for here, we tend to use
the word ‘offensive’ in a somewhat metaphorical sense. But it is quite another
%* Kierkegaard, cited in Fabro, op. cit. pp. 182–3.
&! Soren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, Vol. 6, entry 6601.
&" George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard ’s Authorship (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1968), p. 334.
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to talk, in J. Heywood Thomas’s words, of ‘ the scandalon or the folly which,
when believed, is salvation’ ;&# in other words, for me to claim that your entire
life depends upon your existential commitment to something beyond reason.
It is this existential dimension that makes Christianity’s demands potentially
‘offensive’ or ‘repulsive ’ to the non-believer in a way that someone’s saying
‘My thoughts smell belligerently’ would not be.
Next, let us to turn to those aspects of Climacus’s revocation which I have
accused Conant of overlooking.
3.3 Re-reading the revocation: Climacus as humorist
Our central question, remember, is ‘How should the revocation be read?’ I
submit that this will not be grasped unless we fully unpack the significance
of Climacus’s description of himself as a ‘humorist ’. Conant acknowledges
this general point, but does not – I shall argue – consider in anywhere near
sufficient detail the Postscript’s account of what it means to be a ‘humorist ’.&$
What, then, is the significance of Climacus’s describing himself as a
‘humorist ’ ?
Climacus’s revocation must be read in terms of the modesty characteristic
of the figure he labels the ‘humorist ’. Against those who could claim for their
position that it is The Truth, Climacus is saying something along the lines
of : ‘This is how it appears to me, but you don’t have to listen to me; a mere
humorist. ’ We must, in this connection, pay close attention to Climacus’s
saying ‘that to write a book and to revoke it is not the same as refraining
from writing it, that to write a book that does not demand to be important
for anyone is still not the same as letting it be unwritten’. Assume, as the
sentence structure here suggests,&% that the parts of this quotation either side
of the comma are closely linked. This implies a close connection between
writing a book and revoking it, on the one hand, and writing a book ‘that
does not demand to be important to anyone’, on the other. Climacus has
written a book and revoked it ; and made the link between this activity, and
writing a book which does not demand to be important. This supports my
claim that the revocation is intended to be read in the above way; as
Climacus saying ‘That’s how I see it, but don’t listen to a mere humorist like
me’. But it is important that we know how to read this : it is a statement of
modesty ; not, as Conant seems to read it, an instruction to throw away the main
body of the text.&& There are two closely connected reasons for not reading
the ‘revocation’ in Conant’s way. Firstly, issuing such instructions would be
&# J. Heywood Thomas, ‘Paradox’, in Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulova Thulstrup (eds) Biblioteca
Kierkegaardiana, Vol. 3, Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Boghandel,
1980), p. 199.
&$ The same point could be made of an older, paper to which Conant is indebted, namely Henry E.
Allison’s ‘Christianity and Nonsense ’, Review of Metaphysics 20 (1967), pp. 432–60.
&% There seems no problem with translation in this respect, since the Hongs’ translation seems to me
to be faithful to the Danish.
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out of keeping with the general spirit of both the ‘Appendix’ and other
aspects of Climacus’s self-presentation. And secondly, we should not expect
‘humorists ’ – as Climacus describes them – to be so authoritarian.
3.3.1 Climacus’s self-presentation
How can the above claims be justified? In relation to the first point, recall,
as quoted earlier, that part of the ‘Appendix’ in which Climacus describes
himself as a humorist. Conant claims that Climacus here issues ‘vehement
warnings ’&' as to how his work should be read. But this ‘vehemence’ is
difficult to find. By contrast, I suggest that the two particularly striking
aspects of Climacus’s self-presentation are his modesty, and his lack of a sense
of urgency. Modesty, in that Climacus claims to have no doctrines to teach
(‘To be an authority is much too burdensome an existence for a humorist ’
(CUP 618)) ; and the lack of a sense of urgency, in that he is ‘ satisfied with
his circumstances at the moment, hoping that something better will befall his
lot, he feels especially happy, if worst comes to worst, to be born in this
speculative, theocentric century’ (CUP 617). These two are linked: his
happiness to have been born in such a century can be explained by the
portion of the sentence which immediately follows the first quotation in the
above sentence, in which Climacus says that a humorist ‘ regards it
specifically as one of life’s comforts that there are such men who are able and
willing to be the authority ’ (CUP 618–19). If it might be thought that these
remarks are no more than ironic, note that these characteristics are echoed
by other passages in which Climacus talks about himself, such as the section
in which he describes how he came to try his hand as an author.&( To
illustrate my point, it is important to quote from this at length:
It is now about four years since the idea came to me of wanting to try my hand as
an author. I remember it very clearly. It was on a Sunday; yes, correct, it was a
Sunday afternoon. As usual, I was sitting outside the cafe in Frederiksberg Gardens,
that wonderful garden which for the child was the enchanted land where the king
lived with the queen, that lovely garden which for the youth was a pleasant diversion
in the happy gaiety of the populace, that friendly garden which for the adult is so
cozy in its wistful elevation above the world, that garden where even the envied
glory of royalty is what it indeed is out there – a queen’s recollection of her late lord.
There as usual I sat and smoked my cigar. Regrettably, the only similarity I have
been able to detect between the beginning of my fragment of philosophic endeavour
and the miraculous beginning of that poetic hero was that it was in a public place.
Otherwise there is no similarity at all, and although I am the author of Fragments,
I am so insignificant that I am an outsider in literature. I have not even added to
subscription literature, nor can it truthfully be said that I have a significant place
in it.
&& While he does not use precisely this langauge, recall the earlier point that in his second article
Conant describes ‘An Understanding…’ as part of the ‘ frame of the work’ which is intended to ‘provide
directions for how to read it ’ (KWN, p. 202 ; my emphasis). &' KWN, p. 216.
&( This occurs in the last pages of Part Two, Section Two, Chapter One: ‘Becoming Subjective ’.
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I had been a student for half a score of years. Although I was never lazy, all my
activity was nevertheless only like a splendid inactivity, a kind of occupation I still
much prefer and for which I perhaps have a little genius. I read a great deal, spent
the rest of the day loafing and thinking, or thinking and loafing, but nothing came
of it…of all comforts, indolence is the most comfortable.
So I sat and smoked my cigar until I drifted into thought. Among other thoughts,
I recall these. You are getting on in years, I said to myself, and are becoming an old
man without being anything and without actually undertaking anything. On the
other hand, wherever you look in literature or in life, you see the names and figures
of celebrities, the prized and highly acclaimed people, prominent or much discussed,
the many benefactors of the age who know how to benefit humankind by making
life easier and easier, some by railroads, others by omnibuses and steamships, others
by telegraph, others by easily understood surveys and brief publications of every-
thing worth knowing, and finally the true benefactors of the age who by virtue of
thought systematically make spiritual existence easier and easier and yet more and
more meaningful – and what are you doing?
At this point my introspection was interrupted because my cigar was finished and
a new one had to be lit. So I smoked again, and then suddenly this thought crossed
my mind: you must do something, but since with your limited capabilities it will be
impossible to make anything easier than it has become, you must, with the same
humanitarian enthusiasm as the others have, take it upon yourself to make some-
thing more difficult. This idea pleased me enormously ; it also flattered me that for
this effort I would be loved and respected, as much as anyone else, by the entire
community. (CUP 185–6)
I do not wish to deny that there is irony in this passage. But neither do I see
any justification for dismissing it as ‘merely’ ironic. Rather, we are here given
important clues about aspects of Climacus’s character. Note, as before, the
modesty of his denial of being anything special. Unlike the ‘prized and highly
acclaimed’, his own ‘ limited capabilities ’ prevent him from contributing to
humanity by making life easier in some way. Although he had published one
book prior to the Postscript, he did so at his own expense and remains ‘an
outsider in literature’. (Elsewhere, he tells us that this book has had no
impact, attracting only one review.&)) Even more striking is the lack of a
sense of urgency that leaps out from this self-description. He wanted to ‘ try
his hand as an author’ as long as four years ago, but there is no suggestion
that he set to the task straight away (‘…of all comforts, indolence is the most
comfortable ’). Indeed, it is the thought of having discovered a task for himself
that pleases him, rather than what arises from the task itself. All the aspects
of Climacus’s self-presentation and prose-style – the long digression about
Frederiksberg Gardens ; the fact that his ‘activity was…like a splendid
inactivity ’, since he spent much of his day ‘ loafing and thinking, or thinking
and loafing’ (he has time to give us this combination both ways around); the
fact that relighting his cigar is a more pressing demand than continuing his
train of thought – all this indicates a person who is, to say the least, in no
&) CUP, p. 274n.
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great hurry. And this is some distance from what Conant detects : Climacus
as an issuer of ‘vehement warnings ’ as to how his work should be read.
But these aspects of Climacus’s character should come as no surprise. For
Climacus’s own account of what it means to be a ‘humorist ’ explains why
we should expect such a figure to have an attitude and view of himself which
is both modest and ‘ laid-back’. It is to this that we should now turn.
3.3.2 What does it mean to be a humorist ?
Climacus tells us quite a lot about the life-view of a ‘humorist ’ ; the majority
of which Conant ignores. In the context of the present discussion, there are
two particularly important points to note. Firstly, humorists – unlike
‘ ironists ’ – are concerned with predicaments shared by all human beings.
Secondly, for the humorist – unlike for the Christian – there is no sense of
urgency about the human condition, since our ‘goal ’ is ‘behind us ’ ; what-
ever salvation may be available to us, is assured. Let me explain.
In relation to the first point, we should note that Climacus does not, unlike
most contemporary humour theorists, take ‘humour’ as an all-encompassing
umbrella term for anything perceived as funny; a category of which irony
(along with, say, jokes, satire and wit) would be a sub-category.&* Rather,
Climacus’s umbrella term is ‘ the comic’, and irony and humour are the two
subsections thereof which he discusses in detail. One of the most important
distinctions between irony and humour, as Climacus uses the terms, is that
humour is rather more gentle than irony, in the following sense. Whereas irony
is proud, and tends to divide one person from another – at one point,
Climacus talks of irony in terms of self-assertion and ‘teasing’ (CUP 551) –
humour is concerned with those laughable aspects of the human predicament
which we all share ; hence Climacus’s description of it as ‘ sympathetic ’
(CUP 582) and ‘profound’ (CUP 552n).
The second point is related to this. Irony and humour have similar roles
as ‘border territories ’ between the ‘aesthetic ’, ‘ethical ’ and ‘religious ’
existence-spheres which are pivotal to the thought of both Climacus and
Kierkegaard. At one point, Climacus asserts : ‘ irony is the confinium [border
territory] between the aesthetic and the ethical ; humour the confinium
between the ethical and the religious ’ (CUP 501–2).'! How does this work?
Consider irony first. An ironic view of life stands between living aesthet-
ically (where one lives for ‘ the moment’, with no overriding plans or life-
&* My claim that ‘humo[u]r’ is the main umbrella term in contemporary usage is supported by the
fact that the scholarly journal devoted to various aspects of the study of jokes, cartoons, irony, satire, wit
etc. has taken as its name Humor: International Journal of Humor Research. This same usage is also made by
John Morreall in his collection of the thoughts of philosophers from Plato to the present on these subjects
(John Morreall (ed) The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1987)).
'! For the sake of consistency, I have, throughout this article, anglicised the spelling of terms such as
‘aesthetic ’ and ‘humour’.
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goals) and living ethically (where one commits oneself to ‘eternal ’, universal
values). This is so because the ironist has realized the limitations of living
aesthetically. That is, he has realized that the aesthete endlessly toys with
and reflects upon various existential possibilities, but perpetually postpones
vital decisions concerning his own existence, and that this perpetual ducking
of existential questions prevents his ‘becoming a self ’. However, the ironist
has nothing positive to offer in the place of aesthetic existence. He is not
prepared to make the concrete commitment to ‘ the eternal ’ which is charac-
teristic of the ethical.
The relationship of humour to the ethical and religious existence-spheres
is more problematic than the relation of irony to the aesthetic and the
ethical.'" However, all that matters for the present discussion is the difference
between humour and Religiousness B (Christianity), since it is clear that
humour, for Climacus, stands somewhere between ethical and Christian
living. Whatever their exact relationship, it is clear that Religiousness A and
humour have some important things in common. As C. Stephen Evans puts
it, both the person in Religiousness A and the humorist believe ‘ like Socrates
and Plato, that the eternal is something that all humans possess already’.'#
From the standpoint of Religiousness A, ‘ it must be assumed that every
human being, viewed essentially, participates in… eternal happiness and
finally becomes eternally happy’ (CUP 581). According to Climacus, this
is essentially the view shared by the humorist, as exemplified by his
attitude to suffering. The humorist, like the Christian, ‘has an essential
conception of the suffering in which he is [but] revokes the suffering in the form
of jest ’ (CUP 447). In other words, he has an intellectual understanding that
suffering is essential to human existence, ‘but at the same time it occurs to
him that it most likely is not worth the trouble to become involved in
explaining it. The revocation is the jest ’ (CUP 448). Thus, for the humorist,
there is no really momentous distinction between those within and those outside
a religious mode of existence. The standpoint of Religiousness B, however, is
different : ‘Only on this condition do I become blessed, and as I absolutely
bind myself to it, I thereby exclude everybody else ’ (CUP 582). The
Christian, according to Climacus, has a ‘pathos of separation’ which involves
‘ the pain of sympathy’ (CUP 582). Within Religiousness A, one can
'" In particular, there is some debate as to whether humour is on the boundary between the ethical
and Religiousness A; or whether it borders Religiousness B, humour somehow being incorporated within
Religiousness A. (According to the Postscript, Religiousness A is a form of ‘ immanent ’ religiousness in
which eternal truth is held to be humanly accessible through ‘recollection’. Religiousness B, by contrast,
holds that for it to be possible for humans to relate to eternal truth and attain salvation, ‘ the eternal ’ must
have entered human history. This is Christianity ; and the event in history which makes salvation possible,
according to this view, is God’s incarnation as Christ.) For a brief overview of different scholars’ positions
on the relation between humour, Religiousness A and Religiousness B, see Sylvia Walsh Living Poetically:
Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 212–213n.
'# C. Stephen Evans, ‘Kierkegaard’s view of humor: must Christians always be solemn?’, Faith and
Philosophy 4–2 (1987), p. 182.
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sympathize with ‘every human being qua human being’ (CUP 585) ; within
Christianity, that ‘ sympathy’ can only be with other Christians. So in virtue
of his faith, the Christian, according to Climacus, is conscious of himself and
his kind as being fundamentally different from non-Christians. What matters
about this for our purposes is as follows. The sense of us all being in the same
existential boat which is present in Religiousness A (and which can thereby
bring about ‘ sympathetic humour’ (CUP 582)) is absent from the Christian
who lives with the view that salvation is dependent upon each individual’s
commitment to God through Christ, and the anguish of being unable ‘ to
win’ for Christ his family or beloved (CUP 586).
Thus the lack of urgency of a humorist such as Climacus should come as
no surprise. Why? Because of the clear distinction between the humorist and
the anguished Christian living the life of suffering for his faith.'$ The dis-
tinction is this : while the Christian lives the suffering and anguish of religious
existence, the humorist, thinking that nothing can be done about the
suffering that is the human condition, chooses to laugh about it ; comforted
by his view that ‘ the goal [of existence] lies behind’ (CUP 449) ; that
whatever salvation is available, is available to all. Striving is unnecessary,
since however much we strive, in the end ‘everyone advances equally far ’
(CUP 450).
Let us review the above argument. I am suggesting that Climacus’s
revocation should be understood in the light of his description of himself as
a humorist. Both Climacus’s self-description, and his account of what it means
to be a humorist, give us reasons to expect him to lack a sense of urgency,
and to have a sense of modesty. Both factors should be taken into consider-
ation when assessing how Climacus’s revocation of his work should be read.
And this gives us cause to doubt whether this revocation should be under-
stood as a warning or ‘directions ’ for how to read the work.
Yet Conant, as we have seen, assumes that the revocation is such a set
of directions. Such an assumption lies behind his reference to the Tractatus’
‘ self-annihilating Kierkegaardian format’.'% But is the Postscript ‘ self-anni-
hilating? If my suggestions above are correct, we have good reason to doubt
whether Climacus himself – still less Kierkegaard – intends his revocation to
‘annihilate ’ the rest of the text in this way. Rather, I have suggested, he is
simply denying that he is any authority on the matters on which he has been
ruminating.
Linked to the above are other reasons to question on Conant’s approach
to the ‘revocation’. Conant seems to assume that we can take Climacus’s
revocation ‘straight ’ ; and as ‘gospel ’. I now turn to questioning each of
these assumptions.
'$ Climacus is unclear as to where those fully in Religiousness A fit within this framework. But as we
have said, for our present purposes, we need only compare the humorist with the Christian.
'% MWS, p. 247.
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3.4 Should we read the revocation ‘ straight ’?
Firstly consider the idea of reading Climacus’s revocation ‘ straight ’. The
problem wih such an assumption is this : Why should the ‘Appendix’ (and
the ‘Glance’) be the only parts of the text which we read in this way? Might
not Kierkegaard – as opposed to Climacus – be communicating something
indirectly here? The fact that Climacus describes himself as a ‘humorist ’ is
important in this regard. Kierkegaard (as opposed to Climacus) is using this
fact indirectly to say: if you listen to a humorist, then the message is
‘Understand this text is something to be revoked’ ; as – we might say – an
elaborate joke. But we have been told at great length that the humorist and
the Christian will see the world differently. As Evans puts it, whereas the
humorist stops at ‘ jest ’, the Christian sees things as ‘a blend of jest and
earnestness ’.'& This – and our discussion above – suggests the following in-
terpretation. Recall Climacus’s remark that, after seeing suffering as essential
to existence, the humorist ‘ revokes the suffering in the form of jest ’
(CUP 447). Now supposing the revocation of the whole text at the end is
itself a kind of jest? In other words, that Climacus has the humorist’s
characteristic of ‘humorously ’ revoking at a certain point. Such a humorous
revocation is appropriate because of Climacus the humorist’s beliefs about
our having ‘the eternal ’ already within our possession; that ‘ the goal lies
behind’ (CUP 449). Because of this view, he reckons that explaining many
things is ‘most likely not worth the trouble ’ (CUP 448) ; he is not particularly
bothered whether we have the same world-view that he does, since nothing
much – and certainly not our salvation – depends upon this. But it certainly
does not follow from this that Kierkegaard’s overall authorial intention has
all along been deliberately to ‘have us on’.
How might Conant respond to this? One way of putting my interpretation
would be to say that I want to take ‘ straight ’ Climcacus’s claim to be a
humorist ; and not to take ‘ straight ’ the revocation (I accept that Climacus
is revoking; but not that this message is coming from Kierkegaard, who, as
someone in or closer to Religiousness B than Climacus, will see life
differently). But suppose Conant wanted to do the reverse, drawing on his
view that the revocation is supposed to ‘annihilate ’ the rest of the text ;
suppose he wanted to claim that amongst the things revoked are Climcaus’s
numerous claims to be a humorist. How could we decide between these
readings?
Here, I suggest, is the crucial point. As we saw in our earlier summary of
his revocation, Climacus repeats his claim to be a humorist in the ‘Appendix ’
itself. So Conant has to ignore the significance – as explained above – of
Climacus’s claim to be a humorist even in part of that crucial section which contains
the revocation around which his reading of the Postscript revolves. Whereas I am
'& Evans, op. cit. p. 184.
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suggesting that Climacus revokes the text, but qua humorist ; Kierkegaard
(qua ‘Christian-religious ’ indirect communicator'') is slyly telling us that
this is just what we should expect from a self-confessed ‘humorist ’ like
Climacus. Ultimately I am saying: Why should we take Climacus’s view of
his own writing to be Kierkegaard ’s view, any more than we should take the
work of, say, the aesthete A in Volume 1 of Either}Or to be so?'( Climacus’s
telling us that he is a humorist – and explaining in the main text what this
means – is a reason not to do so. Granted, we have been given this explanation
in the text that Conant often seems to be claiming is intended to be nonsense.
But I do not see any reason to view Climacus’s remarks on irony and humour
as nonsensical ; nor does Conant claim them to be so. And I would argue that
I am being more consistent in my reading in that Conant overlooks the
importance of that part of the section he wants to stress which is not
convenient ; that is, the part of the ‘Appendix’ in which Climacus says he is
a humorist.
To be fair to Conant, we should point out that in two places, he does
explain what he thinks is the significance of Climacus’s describing himself as
a humorist ; but this, I shall now argue, is inadequate. ‘The humour of
Climacus’s doctrine’, Conant tells us in the first article, ‘ is that it gradually
subverts any possible hope for a ground upon which the integrity of a
distinction between the absurdity of the paradox and mere nonsense could
be drawn.’') Now we might well ask: is that all? Why should we accept that
this, and this alone, is ‘ the correct point of departure ’'* of understanding
what Climacus means when he describes himself as a humorist? Why is there
no need to consider the lengths to which Climacus goes to distinguish irony
from humour; the outlook of the humorist from that of a Christian, and so
on? If he were to assert that there is no need because these discussions occur
in the (revoked) main text, Conant would owe us an explanation as to why
we should view Climacus’s remarks on irony and humour as nonsense.
Moreover, Conant’s overlooking the fact that Climacus distinguishes irony
from humour leads him to blur what is, for Climacus, an important distinc-
tion. He does this when he simply maps the contemporary understanding of
‘humour’ as an all-encompassing umbrella term on to Climacus’s description
of himself as a humorist, by quoting a passage in which Climacus in fact talks
about irony. According to Conant, in a passage crucial to the ‘ frame’ of the
'' Recall Kierkegaard’s claim, in The Point of View for my Work as an Author, that the ‘entire purpose ’
of the pseudonymous authorship was ‘religious ’. At one point, Kierkegaard says : ‘Once and for all I must
earnestly beg the kind reader always to bear in mente that the thought behind the whole work is : what
it means to become a Christian’ (The Point of View, trans. Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University
Press, 1939), p. 22n.) And The Point of View is, its subtitle informs us, ‘a direct communication; a report
to history’.
'( Although Conant, not unreasonably, castigates other commentators for conflating Climacus and
Kierkegaard, he is not above doing this himself. See section 3±5 of this article for an example.
') MWS, p. 261. '* MWS, p. 280n.
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work, Climacus says that what caused the reviewer of Philosophical Fragments
to have ‘ the most mistaken impression one can have’ of that text was that
he managed to ‘ leave out the humour(! No; ‘humour’ is the wrong word
here, given Climacus’s very definite usage of that word to mean something
more gentle than irony; as focusing upon aspects of the human predicament
which we all share, rather than as a catch-all term which would include even
the most savage, ‘unsympathetic ’ irony. What Climacus actually says is that
the reviewer has gone wrong in omitting to mention ‘the indefatigable
activity of irony, the parody of speculative thought in the entire plan, the satire
in making efforts as if something ganz Auzerordentliches und zwar Neues
[altogether extraordinary, that is, new] were to come of them, whereas
what always emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in its rightful severity ’
(CUP 275n, my emphases).(" Irony, parody, satire : all branches of ‘ the
comic’ (Climacus’s all-encompassing term), but no mention of ‘humour’ (in
Climacus’s very specific sense of the term). This quotation clearly cannot be
used, therefore, as Conant attempts to use it ; to provide ‘ the correct point
of departure ’ for explaining Climacus’s claim to be a ‘humorist ’. (Note, too,
that this explanation comes from Conant’s being forced to rely, for his
explanation of what Climacus means by his claim that he is a humorist, on
a part of the text which is the ‘ frame’ of the work.)(#
Conant offers a similarly ‘minimal ’ reading of Climacus’s description of
himself as a humorist in his second article, when he quotes Climacus’s remark
that he has ‘a more than ordinary sense of the comic and a certain capacity
for making ludicrous what is ludicrous ’ (CUP 622). But he does not quote
what Climacus goes on to say immediately afterwards : ‘Strangely enough,
I am unable to make ludicrous what is not ludicrous – that presumably
requires other capacities ’ (CUP 622). This, I suggest, is a reference to the
claim Climacus makes earlier on, that there is a form of religiousness – the
‘religiousness of hidden inwardness ’ which borders on Religiousness B –
which is ‘ inaccessible for comic interpretation’ (CUP 522). But my main
point here remains what it was in relation to the mention of the humorist in
Conant’s first article. Namely, that while he is right to suggest that
Climacus’s self-description ‘should cause us to carefully consider what sort of
conviction he has in the doctrines he sets forth’,($ Conant’s own consider-
ation is not detailed enough. As I have been arguing, a more careful con-
sideration of what Climacus takes a ‘humorist ’ to be will suggest different
conclusions to Conant’s.
(! Ibid.
(" Conant actually quotes essentially the same passage as this, but does not notice that there is a
problem in conflating irony, parody and satire with ‘humour’.
(# We might also note that if, as Climacus claims in the above quote, the parody is in the plan of the
Fragments (and I can see that this might indeed be the case for the layout of the Postscript too), there is
no need to infer from this that the text itself (in the case of the Postscript) is parodic. Conant does make
this inference – but note that Climacus doesn’t claim that the actual text is parodic.
($ KWN, p. 201.
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I have argued that there are good reasons not to ‘ throw away’ the content
of the Postscript. Pace Conant, I would support Evans’s view that Climacus’s
revocation ‘must be taken as expressing his own attitude toward the book,
not as an ‘‘objective’’ judgment that the book contains no serious content.
A humorist will therefore read the book in the same spirit as it was written,
a [Christian] religious individual rather differently ’.(% In other words, we
are not compelled to take Climascus’s revocation ‘straight ’. But there is
another perspective from which Conant’s position can be criticized. Let us
finally deal with this.
3.5 Is Climacus’s view ‘gospel ’?
Should Climacus’s revocation of his own work be taken as ‘gospel ’ ? What
I mean by this is that Conant seems to assume – and to castigate ‘most
commentators ’ for failing to recognize – that Climacus’s is the final word on
how the reader with integrity should approach the text. In other words,
Conant’s work assumes an implicit ‘ought’ with regard to the act of reading.
The reader ought to follow Climacus’s ‘directions ’ and revoke what has been
said. This is the assumption which seems to underlie the following worry:
‘one of the difficulties of writing about Kierkegaard…is learning to live with
the delicate burden of both facing up to and yet not collapsing under the
burden of the following thought: how would he respond…to what I have
just written about him?’(&
But why is Conant so concerned about this kind of ‘ faithfulness ’ ? Stephen
Emmanuel points out that ‘ it is a more or less received opinion amongst
literary theorists that, regardless of what we may know about an author’s
life, it is a mistake to suppose that textual meaning is grounded in authorial
intent ’.(' This, of course, has been an issue in aesthetics and literary theory
since Wimsatt and Beardsley’s classic paper on the so-called ‘ intentional
fallacy’ ; and, in a very different theoretical tradition, in the work of Barthes
and the ‘death of the author’ school of literary studies. My point here is not
to claim that a ‘received opinion’ is an indubitable truth, but rather to point
out that this view of the meaning of a text appears to be the view of both
Kierkegaard and Climacus. Firstly Kierkegaard. In a passage Conant is fond
of quoting but here seems to overlook, Kierkegaard himself renounces any
privileged perspective with regard to the views of the pseudonyms: ‘There
is in the pseudonymous books not a single word by me. I have no opinion
about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning except
(% C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript : the Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus
(Atlantic Highlands : Humanities Press International, 1983), p. 204. (Evans himself asserts this view,
rather than adequately supporting it.) I have added the word ‘Christian’, since Evans’s exact phrasing
raises questions about humour’s relation to Religiousness A which, while important in their own right,
need not concern us here.
(& MWS, p. 279n29. Note that Conant here seems to conflate Climacus and Kierkegaard, despite
having criticized other commentators for doing this.
(' Stephen M. Emmanuel Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 8.
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as a reader. ’(( Secondly, Climacus himself. In the ‘ Glance’ – an essential
part of the Postscript’s ‘ frame’, remember, according to Conant – Climacus
praises the other pseudonyms because they have ‘not said anything or misused
a preface to take an official position on the production, as if in a purely legal sense
an author were the best interpreter of his own words ’ (CUP 252, my em-
phasis). If issuing ‘directions ’ on how to read a work would be a ‘misuse ’ of
a preface, clearly the same would apply to doing so in an appendix. Yet
while Conant claims that this is what Climacus is doing, Climacus’s own
words – and words found within the ‘ frame’ to boot – tell us otherwise. This
is further support for my earlier claim that Conant’s reading of the ‘ frame’
on which his interpretation depends is highly selective.()
4. summary and conclusion
Let us review the above arguments. We have been considering Conant’s
claim that the Postscript – like the Tractatus – contains material that is simply
nonsensical, and that we are supposed to be able to see this if we read the text
alright. Conant is wise to focus attention upon Climacus’s revocation of the
text. But the ‘absolute paradox’ with which the text culminates is not
intended to be read as simple nonsense. In arriving at such a view, Conant
overlooks the fact that the views on the ‘absolute paradox’ expressed in
Kierkegaard’s journals (and by the Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus),
seem the same as those of Climacus. The ‘absolute paradox’ differs from
‘simple, old garden variety nonsense ’ not in being ‘more nonsensical ’ than
such ‘ordinary’ nonsense, but in being offensive owing to the existential al-
legiance which it demands. Also, in reading the revocation as ‘directions ’ for
how to read the Postscript, Conant provides no reasons to show that this is not
simply a modest denial of authority on Climacus’s part. Close attention to
Climacus’s self-presentation shows this modesty, together with the lack of a
sense of urgency, to be an important aspect of Climacus’s character. This is,
in fact, connected to the next argument, in which we accused Conant of
reading Climacus’s revocation too ‘straight ’. He pays insufficient attention
to Climacus’s description of himself as a ‘humorist ’ ; the clues the Postscript
gives us as to the humorist’s tendency to issue ‘revocations ’ ; and the difference
between the outlook of a humorist and that of a ‘Christian-religious ’ in-
dividual which indicates that we are in no way compelled to take such
revocations too seriously. The revocation is one view – that of a ‘humorist ’
– on how the text can be read. Linked to this, we questioned, finally,
(( Soren Kierkegaard, ‘A First and Last Declaration’, appended to the end of the Postscript, p. 626,
following Climacus’s ‘An Understanding with the Reader’, and signed ‘S. Kierkegaard’.
() In KWN, Conant suggests the following way of reading the Postscript : ‘ if what one seeks is a mode
of writing that can help the philosophically-inclined reader to overcome his ‘‘ forgetfulness ’’, then what
is required is a literary form which will avoid ‘‘dogmatizing’’ and which allows the author ‘‘ to withdraw
himself ’’ in such a manner that the reader is left to confront himself ’ (KWN, p. 204). But a pseudonymous
author issuing ‘directions ’ as to how his work should be read is hardly going to achieve this end.
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Conant’s taking Climacus’s revocation as ‘gospel ’, in view both of literary
theoretical denials that authorial intent determines textual meaning, and of
the fact that the literary theorist’s view about how the work should be read
is clearly shared by both Kierkegaard and Climacus. If these literary theorists
are right, of course, we need not pay any attention to either Kierkegaard’s
or Climacus’s views of how we should read them. But out point in this last
regard has been to support our earlier claim that Conant’s reading of what
is supposed to be the ‘ frame’ of the Postscript is highly selective, since in
one place – the revocation – he wants to follow the ‘directions ’ Climacus
allegedly issues as to how his work should be read, and yet in another part of
the ‘ frame’ – that part in which he castigates authors who take an ‘official
position’ on how their work should be interpreted – to ignore them. By
contrast, my reading of the revocation as a ‘humorous’, modest denial of
Climacus’s having any authority does not face such a problem.
More generally, I have argued that we need to take seriously the idea that
a consideration of why Climacus describes himself as a ‘humorist ’ – and the
clues the text gives as to what this means – are vital to an understanding of
the Postscript. This idea – hinted at by both Allison and Conant but not really
developed by either – deserves further exploration. The present article has
attempted to set the ball rolling in this direction.(*
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